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Plaintiffs/ Appellants the Martinezes in this Reply Brief will address the 
arguments raised by the Appellee Best Buy in its Appellee's Opening Brief in the 
order in which they appear. 
I. Best Buy's Claim that the Martinezes Failed at Trial to Argue that 
the FTC Definition of Deception is Applicable is Feckless in the 
Extreme 
Best Buy is entirely mistaken in its claim that the Martinezes did not raise or 
argue that the definition of "deception" is to be taken from the FTC developed law 
on this subject. 
During the Martinezes' closing argument, Counsel stated the following: 
22 ... "I'm not going to argue 
23 unconscionability. I'm not sure we could establish the 
24 standard for unconscionability. But deception. 
25 Then we have to ask, what does deception mean? P94 
It's not fraud. And I am going to quote from the National 
2 Consumer Law Center's treatise on Unfair and Deceptive Act 
3 and Practices Statutes. And they are called UDAP Statutes. 
4 And most states have one. And the Utah Consumer Sales 
5 Practice Act is considered to be Utah's Unfair and Deceptive 
6 Act or Practice Statute. 
7 And, in discussing the concept, in almost every 
8 one of those it states [or] prohibits deceptive acts or 
9 practices. And it states under Section 4.2.3.1 [of the National 
Consumer Law Center's treatise on Unfair and Deceptive Act 
and Practices Statutes], the modern 
10 concept of deception as shaped by the Federal court 
11 Interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides 
12 that intent, [scienter], actual reliance or damage and even 
13 actual deception [are] unnecessary. All that is required is 
l 
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14 proof that a practice has a tendency or capacity, or under 
15 the FTC's latest formulation is likely to deceive even a < 
16 significant minority of consumers. And that, usually, the 
17 standard of proof under the UDAP [for] deception is the 
18 preponderance of the evidence standard and not a clear and 
19 convincing that would be required for fraud." 
Trial Transcript, pp 94-95 
The Martinezes clearly stated and argued that "deception" is to be defined 
< 
as the Federal Courts which have interpreted the Federal Trade Commission Act 
have defined it. The Martinezes went on to state what the Federal FTC developed 
i 
definition of "deception" is and argued that the FTC definition of "deception" 
governs in this case. 
The Martinezes then explained in pages 95 through 100 how the conduct of 
Best Buy which was established at trial violated that FTC developed definition of 
"deception." 
Keeping this in mind - i.e., that the Martinezes expressly directed the trial 
court to look at the Federal Court interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act in determining the proper definition of "deception" - let us now look at the 
following statements from Best Buy's Brief: 
"The heart of plaintiffs' brief is based on the definition of the word 
"deceptive" according to FTC case law and precedent. However, plaintiffs 
never raised this argument at the trial court level and it is therefore not 
permissible for appellate review." Appellee's Brief, p. 5. 
2 
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In this case, plaintiffs never raised the issue of the FTC definition of 
"deceptive" at the trial court level and therefore never gave the trial court an 
opportunity to rule on that issue. Instead, plaintiffs raise the issue for the 
first time on appeal, and state the trial court was wrong to not consider the 
FTC precedent. However, the record clearly shows that plaintiffs never 
raised the issue for the trial court's consideration. 
These assertions by Best Buy are so obviously incorrect given the language 
from the Martinezes' closing argument at trial quoted above that Best Buy's 
assertions in this regard almost constitute a fraud upon this Court. 
Why must the Court's of Utah look to FTC interpretations and/or definitions 
of these key terms? Because the Utah legislature directed the Courts of this State 
to follow the FTC's lead in construing the terms of the UCSPA: 
" 13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following 
policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing 
consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive 
and unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales 
practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices 
not inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act relating to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, 
3 
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with respect to the subject of this act among those states which 
enact similar laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply 
with the provisions of this act. " 
The only way "to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not 
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating to 
consumer protection5' is to give the key operative terms - "deception" and 
"unconscionable" - the same meaning in Utah as the Federal Courts and the FTC 
have given to those terms. 
As the Martinezes have stated previously, 
The common definition of"deceptive" is: 
11
 tending or having power to deceive : misleading" - Merriam -Webster 
Does "deceptive" mean "fraud?" No5 of course not. Deception is a lesser 
concept. It is something which "tends" to deceive. 
Is there a scienter requirement? Do you have to prove an intent to deceive? 
Again - NO. Deception is a much less stringent concept to prove: 
"The modem concept of deception, as shaped by federal court 
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, substantially 
eliminates [the common law fraud] proof requirements. To show deception 
under the FTC Act, intent, scienter, actual reliance or damage, and even 
actual deception are unnecessary. All that is required is proof that a practice 
has a tendency or capacity (or, under the FTC's latest formulation, is likely 
to deceive ...." 
4 
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National Consumer Law Center, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices (7th ed. 2008), Section 4.2.3.1, p 190 
The FTC definition of deception does not require intent; a practice is 
deceptive even if there is no intent to deceive. Ibid., p. 193 Citing Federal Trade 
Comm 'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Federal Trade Comm 'n v. 
Freecomm Communications, Inc., 401 F. Ed 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005)(key 
question is not intent to deceive, but 'the likely effect of the claim on the mind of 
the ordinary consumer') 
This means that the Martinezes did not have to show that the Best Buy 
employee had an intention to deceive them. All they had to show is that his actions 
did in fact "tend to deceive," or "tend to mislead" them. 
Consequently, "[f]he heart of plaintiffs' brief which argued that the 
definition of "deception" as developed by FTC case law should have been 
followed, was not only argued directly and clearly to Judge Peuler - but correctly 
followed the mandate of the Utah legislature found in the foregoing language of 
the UCSPA. 
II. The Martinezes Presented a Case Which Was Clearly and 
Squarely Based Upon Allegations That Best Buy Violated the 
UCSPA 
In response to the Martinezes' claim that the Trial Court improperly 
5 
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followed and applied "contract law" principles to this case rather than the correct 
"consumer law55 or "UCSPA law" principles, Best Buy responded by arguing in its 
brief the following: 
"Plaintiffs also claim that the trial court errored [sic] by treating this case as < 
a contract case and using contract principles in determination of their 
UCSPA claim. However, at trial, plaintiffs dressed and presented this case 
as a contract case. As stated above, plaintiffs originally made a claim for 
breach of contract. The record shows that they continued to pursue their < 
case under contract principles and it was not until plaintiffs' final rebuttal 
closing argument that plaintiffs1 voluntarily dismissed their breach of 
contract claim." Appellee's Brief, p. 7 
Once again, Best Buy grossly misrepresents the record in this case. 
The Martinezes in their opening argument, stated the following: 
But what happened here, and we are going to argue that there was 
deception and, essentially, negligent misrepresentation. 
Now, we have a Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act that says you can 
not do deceptive acts. We are not asking this court to find that the contract 
wasn't formed or - well, let me be careful about that. I'm not sure 
(inaudible) about that. But, was there deception? Because the Utah 
Consumers Sales Practice Act says any deceptive act or practice violates the 
statute. Deceptive act or practice. So, I don't believe that any of the case law 
[that] talks about, well, if you should have (inaudible) and didn't sign the 
contract, read the contract you are out of luck. That deals with contract 
formation. That deals with enforcement of the contract, et cetera. That's not 
necessarily our case. Our case is, was there deception during this time 
period? Was there deception? 
Trial Transcript, pp. 9-10 
.... But was there a deception here? Well, deception is, doesn't require an 
intent to defraud. It requires that something is either said that is untrue or 
something is omitted that ought to be disclosed or talked about, is not talked 
6 
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about, etc. Trial Transcript, p. 11 
Now, we are only suing them for the deception that occurred here under the 
Utah Consumers Sales Practice Act and negligent misrepresentation. We 
believe that once the evidence comes in you'll find that what I have told you 
is true. Ill explain further in my closing argument why under the definitions 
of deception these Utah Consumer Sales Practice Act, et cetera, that they are 
in fact violated. 
Trial Transcript, pp. 12-13 
III. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Facts Was Improperly 
Colored By Her Belief That Contract Princinles Aoolied and 
«/ A JL X 
Caused Her to Make Erroneous Legal Rulings 
This was one of those incredibly rare cases in which the facts were almost 
entirely without dispute. 
The problem, as clearly argued by the Martinezes in their Opening Brief, is 
that the Trial Court admittedly applied contract principles to the facts rather than 
the clear provisions of the UCSPA. 
Best Buy tries to get around this argument by trying to hide the incorrect 
legal rulings in its discussion of the findings of the trial court. 
A. The Martinezes' Case at Trial Focused on Whether Best 
Buy's Actions Were Deceptive 
Best Buy argued to the Trial Court that the terms of the contract were clear, 
that the Martinezes should have read it, and if they did not read it they are out of 
luck -even if the Best Buy employee made false and/or misleading statements to 
7 
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the Martinezes about it. 
The Martinezes argued that this case was not about contract formation. This 
case was about whether Best Buy committed any deceptive acts during the course 
of its interaction with the Martinezes - during which the Martinezes were induced 
to sign the HSBC credit card application - which violated the UCSPA. 
The Martinezes argued that even if they could not get out of the contract 
given contract formation principles, they could still argue that the way in which 
Best Buy induced them to enter into the contract was deceptive and the Martinezes 
have a claim under the UCSPA arising because of those acts of deception. 
This is some what analogous to the situation in the decision by this Court in 
Estrada et al v. Mendoza et al, Appeal No. 2100418-CA (Utah App, filed March 
22, 2012), 2012 Ut App. 82 - a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
In that case, Pay Day Loan borrowers were sued in small claims court, did 
not appear, were defaulted and then garnished for amounts which were more than 
they actually owed and/or that which was allowed by law. 
The Appellate Court ruled that the default judgments and the garnishments 
themselves could not be collaterally attacked. 
The Appellate Court also ruled, however, that: 
The UCSPA creates a cause of action against a "seller" who commits either 
8 
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a "deceptive" or an "unconscionable" act or practice . . . in connection with 
a consumer transaction . . . whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction." Id. Sections 13-11-4(1), -5(1). To that end, the UCSPA "shall 
be construed liberally" to, among other things, "protect consumers from 
suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices." Id. 
13-11 -2(2). Ibid, at paragraph 5 
Thus, Plaintiffs here are precluded from collaterally attacking the validity of 
the small claims court writs because they "failed to use any of the available 
legal avenues for challenging [them] at the time they were issued or 
executed." See id. 110. However, Plaintiffs contend that their UCSPA claim 
does not constitute a collateral attack on those writs, because they "are not 
seeking to have the Writ[s] withdrawn" or "to have the garnishments 
released." Rather, they rely on Defendants' conduct in obtaining the writs as 
deceptive or unconscionable practices under the UCSPA and the common 
law of civil conspiracy. Ibid, at paragraph 8 
We agree with Plaintiffs on this point. In pleading their UCSPA claim, 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' acts in obtaining writs in the small claims 
court were "deceptive" or "unconscionable." See Utah Code Ann. 13-11-
4(1), -5(1). Hence their UCSPA claim does not "depend[] upon a 
determination that the [writs] were illegal." See Moss, 2010 UT App 170, 
paragraph 9. The small claims court judgments are thus not "draw[n] in[to] 
question" by this claim. See id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nor do Plaintiffs seek to have those judgments "vacated or revised 
or modified," or "to prevent [their] enforcement." See id. (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs' UCSPA claim is 
not a collateral attack on the small claims judgments and is thus not waived 
by Plaintiffs' failure to challenge the writs in the small claims proceedings. 
Ibid, at paragraph 9 
In this case, the Martinezes advised the Court that the contract which was 
entered into by the Martinezes was with HSBC -not Best Buy. The Martinezes 
said that they were not trying in this case to rescind that contract or seek some 
9 
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other contract related remedy. 
Rather, the Martinezes stated that they were bringing a UCSPA claim 
against Best Buy for Best Buy's actions which were alleged to be "deceptive." As 
the Martinezes stated in their oral argument at trial, the central issue in this case is 
— "Was there deception?" 
The trial court was required, therefore, to apply the provisions and policies 
and principles of the UCSPA to the facts adduced at trial - and not the principles 
of contract formation. 
Just like the plaintiffs/ appellants in the Estrada v. Mendoza case could not 
and did not attack or seek to set aside the default judgments and writs of 
garnishments themselves, but could still argue that the manner in which the Pay 
Day Lender had obtained those garnishments constituted deception or 
unconscionable acts; the Martinezes in this case were free to argue that even if 
they are bound by the contract with HSBC, Best Buy still committed deceptive 
acts during the course of getting the Martinezes to enter into that contract with 
HSBC. 
B. The Martinezes proved each of the categories of deception 
outlined in their Opening Brief and as argued in their Closing 
Argument at Trial Transcript, pp. 93-100 
The Trial Court's finding that the specific categories of deception identified 
10 
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and proven by the Martinezes were not deceptive under the UCSPA constituted 
clear legal error. She did not apply the definition of "deception" as developed by 
the FTC to those facts. 
1. It was deceptive for Best Buy to tell the Martinezes that 
they needed to sign ffhereM and "here" - one being the 
request for Account Shield - in order to apply for the 
credit card 
The Trial Court admitted that it was incorrect for Best Buy to tell the 
Martinezes that in order to "apply for the credit card" the Martinezes had to sign 
on each and every line on the application. The Martinezes did not have to sign the 
line which "requested" the "AccountShield" product or service in order to "apply" 
for the card. 
The evidence was clear that Best Buy said this. 
It is clear that this statement was false. 
The Trial Court said that even though this was false - and therefore clearly 
deceptive - applying contract formation principles the Martinezes were required to 
read the terms of the agreement. 
However, if what the Best Buy employee said to the Martinezes was untrue, 
then he committed a "deceptive act" which violated the UCSPA by making that 
false statement. 
11 
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Best Buy continues to incorrectly urge this Court to follow "Utah's black 
letter law [governing contract formation] that a party is responsible to understand 
the terms of a contract which he or she signs." Appellee's Brief, p. 12. 
The problem for Best Buy is that the "black letter" contract formation 
principles do not govern the UCSPA and its construction and implementation. 
The UCSPA instructs Utah Courts that they must "construe [the UCSPA] 
liberally ... to protect consumers" from the deceptive acts and/or practices of 
"suppliers" in connection with "consumer transactions." This is the "Black Letter 
Law" of consumer law. 
The Trial Court and this Court must apply the correct "Black Letter Law." 
The Trial Court did not. 
2. It was deceptive for Best Buy to fail to provide the Spanish 
translation of the application, but to get the Martinezes to 
sign Exhibit 1 which contained a certification that they had 
been provided with a Spanish translation 
Best Buy knew that it had not provided the Martinezes with a Spanish 
translation of the credit card application. Nevertheless, Best Buy told the 
Martinezes to "sign here" in order to get the credit card - which line contained a 
false representation by the Martinezes that Best Buy had given them a Spanish 
translation. 
12 
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Inducing the Martinezes to sign a false certification that they had been given 
a Spanish translation was clearly "deceptive" and violated the UCSPA. 
3. It was deceptive for Best Buy to fail to disclose that one of 
the signature lines was a request to be enrolled in the 
Account Shield program 
Best Buy not only told the Martinezes that they had to sign "here" and "here" 
in order to apply for the HSBC credit card - which itself was deceptive as outlined 
above, but also omitted to disclose that by signing on one of the lines the 
Martinezes would be obligating themselves to purchase and pay for something 
called the "AccountShield" product. 
This omission of a material fact induced the Martinezes to unwittingly sign 
up for that product/ service and led to the problems and damages about which the 
Martinezes testified at trial on the issue of damages. It was deceptive not to 
disclose this. 
"Black Letter" Contract law says that you are bound by that contract if you 
could have but did not read its provisions. 
"Black Letter" Consumer law says that the "supplier" committed a deceptive 
act by failing to disclose the effect of signing on that line. 
If this Court does not apply the correct "Black Letter" Consumer law to these 
types of cases, the UCSPA will be eviscerated and become meaningless. 
13 
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The UCSPA can only be "construed liberally ... to protect consumers from 
suppliers who commit deceptive ... practices" through having "UCSPA Black 
Letter Law" applied to cases such this. UC 13-11-2(2) and as emphasized in 
Estrada v. Mendoza, supra. ( 
4. It was deceptive for Best Buy to get the Martinezes to sign 
up for the Account Shield product without disclosing how 
much it would cost , 
The Martinezes testified that they had no idea that they were signing up for 
the AccountShield product, much less what it would cost them. They testified that 
they were not told what it would cost... obviously, since they weren't told anything 
about it. 
Best Buy's witness could not testify about what was said by Best Buy to the 
Martinezes about that because he was not there. He had no personal knowledge of 
anything except Best Buy's general practices. 
The Martinezes pointed out that the application does not disclose anything 
about the price of this supposed product: 
"I mean, there isn't even a dollar figure, a price. I mean, this, I think this 
whole [AccountShield] thing is deceptive per se, because there's no 
disclosure of price. None. None. And, they give us, in this case, even if my 
client had read it, she still wouldn't have gotten that disclosure. And there's 
an omission on the document they use to start this as to price. And that is 
hugely [deceptive]." Trial Transcript, p 112. 
14 
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Best Buy's witness - a store manager at a different store - could not read the 
language of the application but said that he thought it was a percentage of the 
balance - but he did not say what that percentage was. 
So Best Buy's witness testified that the cost/ price of the "AccountShield" 
product was some undefined "percentage" of the credit card balance. That still 
does not disclose exactly what the Martinezes would have to pay for this service. 
Further, the application itself belies the Best Buy witness' testimony. The 
application itself has no disclosure of price whatsoever. So, even if the Martinezes 
could have and/or had read it, the price would not have been disclosed to them. 
That has got to be a deceptive practice. Best Buy got the Martinezes to 
unwittingly sign up for a product the price of which was never disclosed to them. 
The Court said that the application could not be read so she would rely upon 
the Best Buy witness' testimony that it stated that the price would be an 
unidentified percentage of the card balance. 
That ruling had the following errors: 
a. The Best Buy witness' testimony still did not identify exactly 
what "percentage" of the card balance would be charged. Was 
it 10%? 1%? 95%? Even after his testimony no one knows. 
b. The Best Buy witness' testimony is contradicted by the 
15 
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language of the application itself. The Martinezes enlarged the 
copy of the application and were able to accurately set forth the 
language of that part of the application in their Opening Brief. 
It does not disclose the price. 
The Trial Court's ruling on this issue should be reversed. 
This was not an "HSBC issue." It was Best Buy that met with the 
Martinezes and had the interaction with them that resulted in them signing the 
application and then being charged for this product which they had no idea they 
were purchasing. It was Best Buy who "offered" this service/ product and who 
during that process of "offering" that service/ product to the Martinezes, committed 
the identified deceptive acts. 
Best Buy must be found liable for its own violations of the UCSPA. BEST 
BUY'S failure to disclose price should be declared to have been deceptive. 
5. It was deceptive for Best Buy to get Mrs. Martinez to sign 
the Account Shield enrollment line without making any 
meaningful disclosure as to what benefit Mrs. Martinez 
would obtain from said enrollment 
The testimony was clear and undisputed that Best Buy did not verbally 
disclose anything to the Martinezes about the AccountShield product/ service. If 
there was any disclosure, it was only that embodied in the language of the written 
16 
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HSBC credit card application. 
However, that language not only does not disclose what that product/service 
will cost, but it does not provide any detail as to exactly what benefit the 
Martinezes would receive by purchasing that product or service. It says something 
about paying or covering an account balance - but how much and under what 
circumstances? It is very unclear. 
It is so unclear that one has to wonder if the Best Buy employee was 
supposed to make some sort of verbal explanation to the Martinezes which would 
fill in the many blanks. 
Since Best Buy's employee failed to disclose anything about this product/ 
service to the Martinezes - it was deceptive to induce them to sign up for this 
product. Fairness required full and complete disclosure about what that product 
would cost and what benefit the Martinezes would receive for that price. 
6. It was deceptive for Best Buy to get Mrs. Martinez to sign 
the Account Shield enrollment line which contained the false 
certification that she had read and understood the program 
summary when Best Buy knew that she had not - because 
they did nothing to explain it to her 
Under the signature line for the Account Shield product, it contains a 
certification that the signor has read and understood the program summary. From 
the undisputed testimony of the Martinezes as to what happened at the Best Buy 
17 
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store, it is clear that the Best Buy employee handed Mrs. Martinez the application 
and said "if you want to apply for this card, you have to sign here and here." One 
of those "here"s was the line for Account Shield. 
That was the entirety of the verbal disclosure about the details of the ' 
Account Shield product - and it was not only deceptively incomplete, but was also 
untrue. 
Further, the language on the application is so unclear and lacking in 
meaningful and detailed disclosure that Best Buy could not have reasonably 
believed that the applicant would be able to "understand" what the program was -
i.e., what it would cost and exactly what she would get for paying that price - even 
if the applicant had read each and every word therein. 
So, it was deceptive to induce Mrs. Martinez to sign that false certification. 
Best Buy got her to sign something that its employee knew was untrue or could not 
have believed from the undisputed facts that it was true. 
7. It was deceptive for Best Buy to electronically tell HSBC 
that Hugo Martinez had agreed to the Account Shield 
product 
Best Buy's witness at trial testified that after applicants for the HSBC credit 
card had filled out the credit card application and signed it, Best Buy would send 
an electronic message to HSBC that the applicants had agreed to the terms of the 
18 
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application - including the enrollment in the Account Shield program/ product. 
Hugo Martinez did not sign on the AccountShield "enrollment" line. 
Hugo Martinez only signed on the general application line. 
Hugo Martinez argued that since he did not sign on AccountShield 
"enrollment" line, he had not agreed to purchase that product/ service. 
Hugo Martinez argued that it was not true for Best Buy to represent to HSBC 
that Hugo Martinez had agreed to be bound personally to pay for the cost of the 
Account Shield product. 
For this reason, Hugo Martinez argued that it was deceptive for Best Buy to 
tell HSBC that he had agreed to purchase and pay for the Account Shield product. 
Appellants argue that this is obvious and that on this additional ground Best 
Buy violated the UCSPA. The Trial Court's ruling otherwise should be reversed. 
IV. The Scope of the UCSPA is not Limited by the "Examples" of 
Wrongful Conduct Set Forth Therein 
The UCSPA contains a list of examples of deceptive conduct. Best Buy 
argues that: 
"One glimpse at this list shows that the intent of the legislature in enacting 
the UCSPA was to deter actions far different from the facts of this case. The 
legislature clearly shows that the UCSPA is intended to stop and penalize 
blatantly dishonest and deceitful sale practices ...." 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 13-14 
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f 
The problem for Best Buy is that there is other language in the UCSPA 
which clearly states that the UCSPA is not limited to these types of supposedly 
"blatantly dishonest and deceitful sales practices.55 
For instance, 13-11-4(1) clearly prohibits any and all "deceptive act[s] or 
practice [s]:55 
"(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction.55 
In the next section, which contains the list of "examples55 of violations to 
which Best Buy was referring, the UCSPA makes it clear that said list does not 
limit the scope of the UCSPA in any way: 
"(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a 
deceptive act or practice if the supplier [commits the following acts]...55 
Of critical and very telling importance is the "purpose55 and "scope55 
language of the UCSPA, which clearly provides that: 
"13-11-2. Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally ...: 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices; 
... [and] 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not 
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission 
20 
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Act relating to consumer protection; ..." 
A detailed analysis of all of the provisions of the UCSPA, rather than 
limiting the analysis solely to "one glimpse" of one portion of the UCSPA, leads 
one to the following inescapable conclusions: 
a. The UCSPA is intended to provide powerful and effective protection 
for Consumers and to also provide them with a private right of action 
and a meaningful remedy in the event that a supplier engages in any 
"deceptive" acts or practices. 
b. The Utah legislature has strongly and clearly instructed the Courts to 
construe the UCSPA liberally in order to protect consumers from 
"deceptive" acts or practices. 
c. The Courts are directed to look to the FTC definitions of "deception" 
for guidance in construing the language of the UCSPA so as to align 
the scope of the UCSPA with the scope of the FTCA. 
d. T he FTC definition of "deception" does not require a showing of 
fraud, scienter, or intent; 
e. The list of "examples" in 13-11 -4(2) is clearly not exclusive. 
f. If a supplier like Best Buy has committed any deceptive act - as 
defined by the Federal FTC definition of "deceptive"- the UCSPA 
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* 
provides the consumer with a remedy including the award of statutory 
damages and attorneys fees. 
V. The UCSPA is Intended to Benefit Suppliers Who Do Not Violate 
Its Terms - Not Best Buy 
Best Buy did not "in good faith comply with the provisions" of the UCSPA. 
Best Buy's conduct was deficient. Best Buy's conduct was in seven identified 
ways "deceptive." 
The UCSPA is intended to benefit retailers who do not violate the UCSPA 
by penalizing those retailers - like Best Buy - who have violated the UCSPA. 
Under the UCSPA, Best Buy can not excuse its deception by saying -
"Well, the consumer should have caught us in our deception;" or 
"It is the consumer's fault that they did not realize that we were deceiving 
them." 
Of course, that would be ridiculous - except for the fact that this is exactly 
what the Trial Court found. 
The Trial Court's rulings must be set aside because it is almost self-evident 
that a supplier can not excuse its violations of the UCSPA by blaming the 
consumer for not catching the supplier in those violations up front. 
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VI. Relief Requested by the Martinezes 
The Martinezes ask this Court to: 
1. Reverse all of Judge Peuler's rulings; 
2. Find that based upon the undisputed testimony adduced at trial, and the 
application of correct Consumer Law legal principles, one or more of the 
seven (7) acts identified by the Martinezes as having been "deceptive" were 
in fact deceptive and constituted violations of the UCSPA; 
3. Find that as a result of those violations of the UCSPA by Best Buy, each of 
the Martinezes is entitled to an award of minimum statutory damages of 
$2,000 from Best Buy, plus their costs and attorneys fees; 
4. Remand this case back to the Trial Court with instructions to enter judgment 
in favor of the Martinezes and against Best Buy accordingly; and that as a 
part thereof, direct the Trial Court to also award the Martinezes their costs 
and attorneys fees - which should include costs and fees incurred in 
prosecuting this appeal. 
DATED this 26th day of March, 2012. 
STEFFENSEN • LAW • OFFICE 
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1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 26th day of March 2011, that I caused two (2) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid to: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Patrick C. Burt 
Kipp and Christian PC 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Fax 801 359 9004 
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VOROS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
f 1 This appeal originated as six separate actions.1 Plaintiffs appeal a judgment on 
the-pleadings in favor of Robin Mendoza, Fred W. Almanza, Feria Access LLC/and 
Southern Management Professional LLC (collectively, Defendants). We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.2 
1. Six borrowers filed separate but identical lawsuits in Salt Lake County. The suits 
were transferred to Utah County and consolidated into a single action. 
2. Pursuant to rule 37(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Defendants filed a 
suggestion of mootness indicating that bankruptcy filings had rendered the appeal 
(continued...) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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\2 "The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the 
same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a 
motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts 
alleged/7 Miller v. Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80, \ 6,110 P.3d 144 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). When "reviewing a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings, this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true; we then 
consider such allegations and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff/7 Id. \ 1 n.l (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
13 Plaintiffs are borrowers on payday loans gone awry.3 Defendant Mendoza 
owned and operated Feria Access, a payday lender with an office in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiffs obtained, then defaulted on, payday loans from Feria Access's Salt Lake City 
office. Defendants sued Plaintiffs in small claims court in Utah County. Plaintiffs allege 
that Defendants sued in Utah County with the "hope that [Plaintiffs] and others 
similarly situated might be unable to appear in Utah County and thus be defaulted/7 
Plaintiffs did fail to appear, and Defendants were indeed awarded default judgments. 
Defendants obtained writs of garnishment in amounts that Plaintiffs allege were 
2. (...continued) 
moot as to Mendoza and Feria Access. See Utah R. App. P. 37(a); Salt Lake County v. 
Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, f 15, 234 P.3d 1105 ("An appeal is moot if during the 
pendency of the appeal circumstances change so that the controversy is eliminated, 
thereby rendering the relief requested impossible or of no legal effect/7 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs did not object or present 
counterargument in writing or at oral argument. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as 
to Mendoza and Feria Access. 
3. "Payday loans are small-dollar, short-term, unsecured loans that borrowers promise 
to repay out of their next paycheck or regular income payment Because these loans 
have such short terms to maturity, the cost of borrowing, expressed as an annual 
percentage rate, can range from 300 percent to 1,000 percent, or more." Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, Payday Lending, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/ 
012903fyi.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). "While payday lending was virtually 
nonexistent in 1985, by 2002 it exploded into an industry with over twenty-five 
thousand retail outlets nationwide, more than McDonald's, Burger King, Sears, J.C. 
Penney, and Target stores combined/7 Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday 
Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 
92 Minn. L. Rev. 1110,1111 (2008). 
o 
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inflated. Plaintiffs neither appealed nor resorted to remedies available to them under 
rule 64D of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides a process to object to 
inaccurate garnishments. Instead, Plaintiffs filed independent actions in district court. 
14 Plaintiffs7 complaint alleges three causes of action: civil conspiracy, violation of 
the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (the UCSPA), and violation of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act. In granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial 
court ruled that Plaintiffs should have availed themselves of the remedies that the Utah 
Rules of Small Claims Procedure provide; that Plaintiffs waived any causes of action 
based on the inflated garnishments for failure to seek relief under rule 64D in small 
claims court; and that Plaintiffs7 complaint failed to adequately state claims for civil 
conspiracy, violation of the UCSPA, and violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 
Plaintiffs raise multiple claims of error on appeal. 
1. Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act 
15 The gravamen of Plaintiffs7 case is that the Defendants violated the UCSPA, see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-1 to -23 (2009). The UCSPA creates a cause of action against a 
/7seller7/ who commits either a "deceptive77 or an "unconscionable" "act or practice . . . in 
connection with a consumer transaction . . . whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction." Id. §§ 13-11-4(1), -5(1). To that end, the UCSPA "shall be construed 
liberally" to, among other things, "protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices." Id. § 13-11-2(2). 
16 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in deceptive and unconscionable 
conduct by obtaining garnishments for more money than they were legally owed. The 
trial court ruled that Plaintiffs waived any claim arising out of inflated garnishment 
amounts by bypassing remedies available to them in small claims court under rule 64D 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 64D(h) provides a process by which a 
judgment debtor can challenge a writ of garnishment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(h). Rule 
64D applies to the collection of small claims judgments. See Utah R. Small Claims P. 
11(a) ("Judgments may be collected under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/7). 
Plaintiffs argue that their failure to challenge the allegedly flawed garnishments in the 
underlying small claims action does not preclude them from bringing a new action 
based on those flaws. 
17 "'With rare exception, when a court with proper jurisdiction enters a final 
judgment,. . . that judgment can only be attacked on direct appeal.7" Moss v. Parr 
Waddoups Brown Gee& Loveless, 2010 UT App 170,19, 237 P.3d 899 (omission in 
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1 
original) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,f25, 70 P.3d 111), cert granted, 245 P.3d 
757 (Utah 2010) .4 "'"The general rule . . . is that a judgment may not be drawn in 
question in a collateral proceeding and an attack upon a judgment is regarded as 
collateral if made when the judgment is offered as the basis of a claim in a subsequent 
proceeding.,,,,/ Id. (quoting Tolle v. Fenley, 2006 UT App 78,f15,132 P.3d 63 (quoting 
Olsen v. Board ofEduc, 571 P.2d 1336,1338 (Utah 1977))). '""Where a judgment is 
attacked in other ways than by proceedings in the original action to have it vacated or 
revised or modified or by a proceeding in equity to prevent its enforcement, the attack 
is a 'Collateral Attack""" Id. (quoting Olsen, 571 P.2d at 1338 (quotingRestatement of 
Judgments § 11 cmt. a (1942))).5 
%8 Thus, Plaintiffs here are precluded from collaterally attacking the validity of the 
small claims court writs because they 'Tailed to use any of the available legal avenues 
for challenging [them] at the time they were issued or executed/7 See id. f 10 . 
However, Plaintiffs contend that their UCSPA claim does not constitute a collateral 
attack on those writs, because they "are not seeking to have the Writ[s] withdrawn" or 
"to have the garnishments released." Rather, they rely on Defendants' conduct in 
obtaining the writs as deceptive or unconscionable practices under the UCSPA and the 
common law of civil conspiracy. 
4. "The fact that certiorari was granted . . . does not deprive [the opinion] of 
precedential value for us." United States ex rel. Daneffv. Henderson, 501 F.2d 1180,1181 
(2d Or. 1974) (citation omitted); cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,689 (1997) ("[0]ur 
decision to grant the petition [for certiorari] expressed no judgment concerning the 
merits of the case . . . . " (citation omitted)). 
5. It is unclear whether the plaintiffs in Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 
2010 UT App 170, 237 P.3d 899, cert granted, 245 P.3d 757 (Utah 2010), alleged fraud on 
the court under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs here did. 
After describing various means of challenging a final judgment in the trial court, rule 
60(b) states, "This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, Plaintiffs' brief 
never mentions rule 60(b) and cites no cases involving fraud on the court. Accordingly, 
any rule 60(b) claim is either abandoned on appeal or inadequately briefed. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating that an adequately briefed argument "contain[s] the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including 
the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"). 
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f 9 We agree with Plaintiffs on this point. In pleading their UCSPA claim, Plaintiffs 
allege that Defendants' acts in obtaining writs in the small claims court were 
"deceptive" or "unconscionable." See Utah Code Ann. §§ 1341-4(1), -5(1). Hence their 
UCSPA claim does not "dependf] upon a determination that the [writs] were illegal." 
See Moss, 2010 UT App 170, % 9. The small claims court judgments are thus not 
"draw[n] in[to] question" by this claim. See id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nor do Plaintiffs seek to have those judgments "vacated or revised or 
modified," or "to prevent [their] enforcement/7 See id. (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs' UCSPA claim is not a collateral attack on the small 
claims judgments and is thus not waived by Plaintiffs' failure to challenge the writs in 
the small claims proceedings. 
110 In dismissing Plaintiffs' claim under the UCSPA, the trial court also perfunctorily 
stated that the acts alleged by Plaintiffs are not deceptive or unconscionable acts or 
practices under the UCSPA. We do not read this as a ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs' 
UCSPA claims. The UCSPA establishes a policy of giving plaintiffs a reasonable 
opportunity to prove unconscionability: "If it is claimed or appears to the court that an 
act or practice may be unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in 
making its determination." Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-5(2). In light of this policy—and in 
light of the absence of any discussion of the requirements of the UCSPA and whether 
the alleged acts met those requirements—we read the trial court's statements as a 
conclusion that the Plaintiffs' allegations constituted a collateral attack on the writs 
rather than a ruling on the merits of an UCSPA claim at the pleadings stage.6 
f l l We accordingly reverse the trial court's ruling that Plaintiffs' failure to challenge 
the writs in the small claims action bars their claim under the UCSPA and remand for 
further proceedings on this claim.7 
6. Given our resolution of the issue, we need not address Plaintiffs' argument that they 
were denied due process due to their inability to address the merits of their UCSPA 
claim below. Nor do we address either party's arguments on appeal relating to the 
merits of Plaintiffs' UCSPA claim. 
7. A deceptive or unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a 
consumer transaction violates the UCSPA "whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction." Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-11-4(1), -5(1) (2009). We express no opinion as to 
(continued...) 
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2. Civil Conspiracy 
112 Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in ruling that their complaint 
failed to adequately plead a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 
113 To establish a claim of civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: "'(1) a 
combination of two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of 
the minds on the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) 
damages as a proximate result thereof/" Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT App 
56,112,42 P.3d 1253 (quoting Alta Indus, v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282,1290 n.7 (Utah 1993)). 
"The claim of civil conspiracy 'require[s], as one of [its] essential elements, an 
underlying tort/" Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362,121,199 P.3d 971 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,136, 79 P.3d 974). "Thus, in order 
to "sufficiently plead" a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff is 'obligated to adequately 
plead the existence of such a tort/" Id. (quoting Coroles, 2003 UT App 339,136). 
"Where plaintiffs have ''not adequately pleaded any of the basic torts they allege . . . 
dismissal of their civil conspiracy claim" is appropriate." Id. (omission in original) 
(quoting Coroles, 2003 UT App 339,138); see also 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conspiracy § 50 (2009) 
("[I]f the acts alleged to constitute the underlying wrong provide no cause of action, 
then neither is there a cause of action for the conspiracy itself."). 
114 To satisfy the fourth element, Plaintiffs rely on the following six underlying torts: 
(a) fraud on the court in obtaining writs of execution and/or garnishment, (b) fraud on 
Plaintiffs based on inflated amounts of the writs of execution and/or garnishment, (c) 
violation of the UCSPA, (d) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, (e) 
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and (f) defamation by reporting false credit 
information. 
115 The first two underlying torts named above rely on the issuance of post-
judgment writs in the small claims cases to satisfy the requirement of an unlawful act. 
Thus, unlike the UCSPA claim, this cause of action does "depend[] upon a 
determination that the . . . orders were illegal," Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless, 2010 UT App 170,19,237 P.3d 899 (omission in original), cert granted, 245 P.3d 
757 (Utah 2010).. It is thus barred as a collateral attack on a final judgment. We 
7. (...continued) 
whether an act occurring in the course of litigation arising from a consumer transaction 
falls within this definition. 
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therefore do not disturb the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs7 conspiracy claim insofar 
as it is based on fraud.8 
f 16 The third underlying tort named above is violation of the UCSPA. As explained 
above, Plaintiffs' UCSPA claim is not barred as a collateral attack on a prior judgment, 
because it does not depend on the small claims court writs being unlawful—it is 
sufficient that they were deceptive or unconscionable. See supra I f 8-10. We therefore 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim insofar as it is 
based on a violation of the UCSPA. To the extent Plaintiffs are able to maintain their 
UCSPA claim, that claim is eligible to serve as a predicate act for their civil conspiracy 
claim. 
ilr7 The trial court also ruled that Plaintiffs had conceded that they do not have a 
cause of action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act or for defamation. Our review of 
the record suggests that the trial court was correct on this point. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs' brief on appeal does not challenge the ruling. In addition, Plaintiffs concede 
that they do not have an independent cause of action under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs take the position that a wrongful act may serve as 
the underlying tort for purposes of a conspiracy claim even if they have no independent 
cause of action based on that wrongful act. Plaintiffs cite no authority in support of this 
theory, nor do they attempt to distinguish apparently contrary authority. For example, 
this court has cited authority stating that if "'the acts alleged to constitute the 
underlying wrong provide no cause of action, then neither is there a cause of action for 
8. We also agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead the 
underlying tort of fraud. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that 
"[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." The tort of fraud includes nine elements. See Armed 
Forces Ins: Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f 16, 70 P.3d 35 (listing the elements). 
However, mere recitation of those elements, or conclusory allegations unsupported by 
allegations of relevant surrounding facts, does not satisfy rule 9(b)'s particularity 
standard. Id. Here, Plaintiffs alleged only that "the defendants have requested and 
obtained through fraud upon the Court writs of execution and/or writs of garnishment 
against the Plaintiff(s) which included unjustified and deliberately inflated 'costs' or 
'judgment' amounts, and the like." We thus agree with the trial court that, insofar as 
the Plaintiffs' civil conspiracy claim rests on the underlying tort of fraud, it fails to 
adequately allege the elements of civil conspiracy and was properly dismissed on that 
ground. 
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the conspiracy itself/" Puttuck, 2008 UT App 362, J 21 (quoting 16 Am. Jur. 2d 
Conspiracy § 50 (1998)). Plaintiffs7 absence of briefing on this point suggests that they 
may have abandoned it. In any event, we will not reverse on the basis of an unbriefed 
argument. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, 1 13, 99 P.3d 820 
("[T]his court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research/7 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
118 In sum, insofar as Plaintiffs7 claim for civil conspiracy rests on an allegation that 
Defendants violated the UCSPA, we reverse the trial court's dismissal and remand for 
further proceedings. Insofar as the civil conspiracy claim rests on other grounds, we 
affirm the trial court's dismissal. 
3. Dismissal Without Leave to Amend 
119 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred by dismissing their complaint 
without granting leave to amend. "We review a district court's denial of leave to 
amend for an abuse of discretion/7 Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68,115, 243 P.3d 
1275. 
120 After a responsive pleading has been served, "a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be 
freely given when justice so requires/7 Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). "To properly move for 
leave to amend a complaint, a litigant must file a motion that 'shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order 
sought/77 Holmes Deo., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,157, 48 P.3d 895 (quoting Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(b)(1)). "Further, a motion for leave to amend must be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities in support, and by a proposed amended 
complaint/7 Id. (citing Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4~501(1)(A) (repealed 2003); Behrens v. 
Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179,1182 (Utah 1983); Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275,1279 
(11th Cir. 1999)); accord Puttuck v. Gendron, 2008 UT App 362,123,199 P.3d 971. 
121 Plaintiffs here complied with none of these requirements. In addition, their 
argument on appeal is scant, consisting of two sentences. They cite two cases without 
analysis, one of which involves a litigant who, unlike Plaintiffs here, filed a written 
motion to amend accompanied by a proposed amended complaint and, apparently, a 
memorandum. See Hudgens, 2010 UT 68,110. We see no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court on this point. 
o 
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f 22 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
123 WE CONCUR: 
Stephen L. Roth, Judge 
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